نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسنده
گروه حقوق، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه لرستان، خرم آباد، ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
The impossible crime remains a theoretically complex issue and a practically troublesome problem in criminal law. Theorists have proposed various classification criteria to confront this dilemma and to refine the category of punishable impossible offenses. The two most common classifications are: 1) the division into absolute and relative, and 2) the division into legal and factual. The first classification is prevalent in some Arab countries, while the second is widely accepted in Common Law. The Iranian legal system, based on its latest amendments in 2013 (1392 SH), has also inclined toward the second classification. A crucial question is: which classification provides a more precise basis for distinguishing between types of impossible crimes, enabling both a conceptual differentiation and a clearer practical identification of instances, thereby determining which impossible crimes are punishable? Using a descriptive and analytical method and adopting a critical approach toward the theories, examples, and definitions presented in Common Law and some Arab countries, this article concludes that judicial experience and ambiguous, conflicting, and inconsistent legal examples have demonstrated that neither approach has succeeded in providing a clear picture of the impossible "crime." Each theory suffers from internal and external confusion, and neither has provided a clear theoretical basis for distinction. Until a more precise substantive basis for the categorization of impossible crime is established, perhaps the best approach for criminal response—following some common law scholars—is to consider an impossible crime punishable only if the criminal intent is clearly proven and the acts undertaken go beyond mere preparatory acts, indicating an objective dangerousness.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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